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Abstract 
This article examines the effects of global capitalism and state 
coordination on the financial behaviour of chaebol (business conglomerates) in 
South Korea. This study focuses on the evolution from controller to coordinator in 
the post-developmental South Korean state. In recent times, the Korean 
government has been studied as the exemplar of the Asian newly industrializing 
economies (NIEs) based on its ability to control economic development. As civil 
society pressures outgrew government control in the 1990s, the government’s 
mission shifted from control to coordination – the state sought to accommodate 
newly emerging or enlarged bargaining domains of key political-economic actors. 
However, the emergent post-developmental state is buffeted by the growing 
strength of the private sector, domestically and transnationally. While civil society 
strived to mobilize mass movements to further social democracy, the neoliberal 
evolution of capitalist class interests generated institutional configurations 
favouring the hegemony of finance capital.   
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While East Asian business groups are well studied, the focus has been on the 
economic success produced by particular industrial relationships within the 
developmental state (DS). Now confronted by expanding global capitalism, the state in the 
post-developmental era is greatly affected by transnational stimuli and strives to regain 
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legitimacy over both the private sector and civil society. Hintze’s (1975) classic concept of 
the state as an actor constrained by historically changing transnational contexts finds its 
modern echo in the conceptualization of the post-developmental state (PDS) in South 
Korea. 
The 1997 East Asian economic crisis prompted Asian governments to adopt 
neo-liberal reforms that overwrote traditional developmental strategies. The roots of 
structural change in business entities arose from two related processes of global expansion 
in the previous decade. First came the state-mediated effect on their governing 
arrangements amid the waning control of the DS and the waxing finance capital; and the 
direct effect of global capitalism altered the financial structure of various business 
entities.1 The transnational market order reaffirms the classical Marxist view of the 
hierarchical relationship between global financial institutions – mostly housed in western 
countries – and the countries and the enterprises that are rated by those institutions.  
This study focuses on the leverage that transnational capital obtains as the local 
business groups in the DS outgrow the financial resources of their home country.2 Then it 
addresses how global capitalism affects subsets of social formation, particularly 
business-state relations in South Korea (henceforth Korea).3 The financial profile of the 
Korean economy emphasizes chaebol-centered capitalism. The financial behavior of 
chaebol in Korea reveals the external influence of global capitalism on domestic actors and 
the internal changes of the state from a controller to a coordinator. In mediating the 
impact of transnational capitalist expansion, the state also had to reconcile disputes of 
labour-management relations. Despite the political oppression by the DS, the economic 
success of the DS ultimately strengthened civil society. The PDS, unlike the historical DS, 
is neither able nor willing to stifle industrial relations but instead attempts to coordinate 
these competing interests among industry and civil society.  
 
The Grand Processes of Global Capitalism: State Guidance to Global Standards  
 
A corporate group is a preferred form in emerging economies because a strong state 
encourages this particular form of economic organization. Since Johnson (1982) first 
                                            
1 Robinson and Harris (2000) argue that a new global hegemonic bloc emerged in a ruling body of global 
governance under world capitalism. This new historic bloc includes transnational corporations and financial 
institutions that behave as a class, affecting global circuits of accumulation beyond locality and domestic 
polity.  
2 Transnational refers to cross-border practices that transcend national boundaries; global to the complete 
denationalization of corporate procedures and activities; and international to relationships mediated by the 
nation-state system (Sklair 2001). 
3 I use the term subsets of social formation to refer to the dyadic relations of state-capitalist, labour-capital 
and state-labour relationships. The present study focuses attention on state-capitalist relations.   
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coined the term, developmental state versus regulatory state, comparative studies have 
mostly focused on state intervention in producing economic success.4 Such propensity 
dominated both academicians’ theorizing state configuration and policy-makers’ 
administrative effort to attain it. Ironically, both theoreticians and policy-makers tend to 
underestimate the aggressive expansion of capitalism, domestically and transnationally.  
The DS apparatus includes a bureaucracy ideologically buttressed by Weber’s 
legitimate monopoly of coercion (Camic, Gorski, and Trubek 2005) and practically 
equipped with a rigid top-down ordered bureaucracy. Such a bureaucracy is 
simultaneously a tool for monitoring people and a vehicle for implementing economic 
policy. The ties between the bureaucracy and the large corporations control the upward 
mobility of new players outside exclusive political economy networks. This structure 
developed in most successful instances of DS. Among its most important features is 
governmental supervision of financial institutions that provides otherwise unavailable 
funds to leading companies.5 State intervention is a key component for establishing a 
rule-following culture within the business community; developing inter-firm cohesiveness 
in key sectors (Evans 1995); orchestrating the coordination of several sectors to achieve 
international competitiveness (Wade 1990); and emphasizing macro-economic policies at 
the expense of labour rights (Deyo 1989). Besides price controls, tax exemption for major 
industries, and the construction of infrastructure, the state monitoring of capital most 
significantly included control over the financial system. 
Business groups in DS like the Korean chaebols—with a long history of centrality 
to the economy and organic ties to the political elite—were designated as leading partners 
for industrialization. Corporate leaders complied with state policy, making key business 
decisions based on state policy, even when such decisions were inconsistent with 
short-term economic efficiency or profitability. This embeddedness was rephrased as 
governed interdependence (Weiss and Hobson 1995, 169), or as crony capitalism (Krugman 
1994, Kang 2002) — control over corporate assets based on social ties between economic 
and political elites. For example, the Suharto regime in Indonesia provided Astra with a 
protective environment and inside information crucial to the company’s operations. 
Thailand’s government sponsored Charoen Pokphand’s entry into agribusiness, its 
diversification into telecommunications, and its expansion to China. The Malaysian 
government’s New Economic Policy allowed the Robert Kuok Group to obtain a 
monopoly in the sugar industry. The Thai, Philippine, and Indonesian states encouraged 
the development of large, vertically integrated textile companies (Brown 2000).  
                                            
4 For the best accounts of the role of the state in the economic development, see Akyuz and Gore (1996); 
Amsden (1989), Tun-jen Cheng (1987), Evans (1995), Haggard (1990); see David Kang (2002), Duck-Jin 
Chang (1999) Sea-Jin Chang (2003), Eun-Mee Kim (1997) and Yeon-Ho Lee (1997) for Korea; Johnson 
(1982) for Japan; Wade (1990) for Taiwan; Campos and Root (1996), Koh (1995), and Quah (1982) for 
Singapore; Root (1996) for Hong Kong. 
5 See Eun-Mee Kim (1997); Woo-Cumings (1999); Chibber (2002) and (2003). 
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Business entities nurtured by the DS were under normative pressure in tandem 
with the obvious coercion exercised by the strong state.6 Not only finance capital but also 
most professional expertise was controlled by the state through its structural ties to key 
scholars and scholarly associations. Businesses were guided by direct negotiation of 
investment agreements and the homogeneous advice offered by state-affiliated experts. 
This coercive and normative pressure made this form of business group dominant in the 
economy, reflecting a state preference for large entities. The state demanded political 
funding in exchange for information about governmental investment plans and subsidies. 
Additionally, the military-like corporate culture was supported by the authoritarian 
capitalist DS. Those “mutual hostages” (Kang 2002) led to similar outcomes in the 
financial behavior of business groups which included high debt ratios and circumscribed 
diversification in size expansion.7  
Embedded autonomy theoretically bridges the self-sufficiency of the state 
apparatus and its coherent administration over the private sector (Evans 1995). Only 
when internal bureaucratic coherence is maintained, the state utilizes external networks 
without compromising its autonomy. The connectedness then represents a high level of 
state competence. The embedded autonomy depends on both a rule-following culture and 
an effective bureaucracy; as well as the historically determined character of the state 
apparatus (Evans 1995, 50). Korean and Taiwanese bureaucratic organizations 
comparatively showed that state autonomy may or may not succeed if the bureaucracy 
does not follow the rule but relies economically upon the private sector whom “the state 
shares a joint project of transformation” (Evans 1995, 59). However, the same degree of 
rule-following culture generated opposite outcomes, depending on the interagency 
relations within the government. Korean DS produced economic growth through the 
successful coordination among state agencies while India failed because the various state 
agencies were closely tied to the corporate sectors that they were supposed to regulate 
(Chibber 2002) .   
These theories characterize a strong DS like Korea as a controller, the planner and 
sustainer of state capitalism leading to economic growth. Simultaneously, it coordinated 
interagency relations and controlled the relationships of each agency to the private sector. 
This unusual emphasis on the state apparatus tends to treat DS as the only dynamic force, 
with other social actors as mere expressions of state planning. The changing relationships 
of government with civil society and with the capitalist class are critical in determining 
economic trajectories. The potential for bottom-up effects from civil society are 
                                            
6 For more detailed conceptualization of normative, coercive and mimetic isomorphic pressures, see Powell 
and DiMaggio (1991). 
7 Size expansion behavior temporarily waned at the economic crisis in 1997. Soon after the economy 
recovered, however, chaebols continued to expand the number of subsidiaries. The top four chaebols 
(Samsung, Hyundai, SK and LG) had a 30% increase in the number of subsidiaries as of 2007 after the crisis 
(www.saesayon.org).   
148
 KIM: Global Capital, Business Groups and State Coordination 
 
underestimated, as are the independent actions of businesses, either as a class or in 
smaller factions. Song (2011) critiques both DS theorists (e.g., Johnson, Amsden, Wade) 
and institutionalists (e.g., Chibber and Evans) for their common lack of criticism of 
dictatorial statism and their heavy focus on the linkage of state and private sectors for 
development. Despite Song’s misreading on developmental state theory as if it takes 
authoritarianism for granted for the economic growth,8 she addresses theorizing DS 
beyond a national level as essential. To reconsider the state’s class interests while relocating 
the DS within the hierarchical world-system would create more room to identify the 
transformation of DS into PDS in a global context.  
Alternative analysis has to place both the dynamics of global capitalism in the 
private sector and the state-business relationship at the center. Left unanalyzed is the 
impact of global capitalism on the nationally embedded structure. Bureaucratic coherence 
becomes harder to maintain once the state and its economic partners are integrated into 
transnational scenes. While the state apparatus could operate with relative autonomy in 
the national context, the same autonomy is no longer allowed in the ongoing 
confrontations between transnational and local capital on the one hand, and between 
global capitalism and global civil society on the other. Traditional analysis of DS has the 
least room for these issues. 
The private sector’s transnational expansion first undermines the legitimate 
monopoly of state control over capital and financial expertise. The state retains the 
internal cohesiveness that allowed it to guide economic development during the initial 
expansionary period. As business groups invest in foreign countries and procure capital 
from foreign capital markets, however, state monopoly declines. Transnational capital 
flows bolster the influence of foreign lending institutions and the credit-rating system 
that guides their investment. This undermines state control over finance and its industrial 
policy becomes contested by the transnational credit-rating institutions. Those external 
agencies evaluate the sovereign nations and their local firms for international capital 
based on global standards.  
Therefore, the governments of late developers, like Korea of the 1980s and 1990s, 
responded to these pressures by accepting new global standards to work within the global 
framework. State strategy evolved into a series of ad-hoc remedies designed to 
accommodate the penetration of global capitalism and declining control over the private 
sector. This evolution involved a fundamental reconceptualization of the state: from an 
                                            
8 For instance, Chalmers Johnson (1999) the creator of DS theory, in the compiled book of state theorists’ 
reviews on DS (Woo-Cumings 1999a) after the East Asian economic crisis, had already defended his 
original concerns on the pervasive false criticism of DS theory for a possible dangerous justification given to 
any authoritarian regime for development. It is noteworthy to closely read his distinction between 
developmental and authoritarian based on cultural context of East Asia, which gives a particular legitimacy 
to the developmental state.    
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authoritative/dictatorial organizer of economic policy to a coordinator between local 
needs and the demands of the global political-economy. 
 
Global Standards Under the Hegemony of Finance Capital 
 
Hobsbawm (1979) had posited that the world economy had almost completed the 
transition from an aggregation of distinct national economies to an integrated and 
coordinated global division of labour in production and trade. Western-based 
institutional isomorphism has been pronounced in global financial system. 9  The 
transformation of DS has occurred amid its integration into the global financial system. 
Capital dependence generated structural constraints for industrial firms, which in turn 
delegated conditional power to financial institutions. 
While regional economic blocs exist, global convergence towards a set of 
economic rules for businesses becomes tangible as is observed in global competition rules, 
specific lending patterns, dependence on global financial institutions, conforming 
national standards to global standards for rating investment risks and options, and 
restructuring the domestic financial system.10 Although the debate continues whether a 
TCC (transnational capitalist class) exists as a tangible power network in the global 
economy,11 such global isomorphic processes continue to drive the corporate action of 
participants. The power of agreement between multiple parties is not susceptible to 
control by an individual nation-state. Recent research on transnational policy-planning 
networks finds that a TCC is forming unevenly regionally, with the North Atlantic ruling 
class at the center of the class formation process via the global corporate-policy network 
(Carroll and Sapinski 2010). Additionally, the establishment and enforcement of 
                                            
9 I refer global financial system to the systematic interplay of financial institutions and regulations that 
operate both at and beyond national or regional level. The major participants are global institutions (e.g. 
IMF and World Bank), nation-state’s agencies (e.g. central banks and finance ministries), and private 
institutions acting on a global level (e.g. transnational banks and hedge funds). These actors are concisely 
divided into three categories:  regulators (e.g. the European Central Bank or the IMF), regulated entities 
(e.g. international banks and insurance companies) and the lightly or non-regulated bodies (e.g. hedge 
funds, private equity and bank sponsored entities such as off-balance-sheet vehicles).  
10 For elaborations of the ways in which the world economy homogenizes corporate behavior, see 
Chase-Dunn (1998). Globalizing aspiration of firms expressed in organizational forms is more pronounce 
in financial industry. National aspirations to advance financial industry by benchmarking the systems in 
core countries bred oligopolistic financial groups in countries like Korea, i.e., Four Major Financial Groups, 
including Hana, KB, Woori and Shinhan.    
11 Sklair (2001) interviewed global fortune 500 companies’ CEOs to show the existence of TCC while 
Carroll (2010) tested global interlocks and concluded that the existence of an inner circle of TCC is highly 
plausible. 
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International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the Group of 20 Leaders (G20) 
indicates a global convergence of national standards.12  
In the DS, it was common for high-level state administrative personnel to be 
assigned by the state to financial institutions, where they monitored financial decisions to 
insure their consistency with government policy. Such placements, however, faded for 
two possible reasons. First, domestic banks are less dominant as loci of key lending 
decisions than in the DS, and foreign direct investors are loosely monitored by 
government institutions. The dynamics of capital flows started conditioning the role of 
the state and economic trajectories. Secondly, foreign stockholders have occupied 
domestic banks as neo-liberal policies are enacted. The domestic banks are no longer the 
traditional extension of the state apparatus. Thus, the notion of finance hegemony has 
relevance to corporate behavior in the new organizational field of global finance.  
The finance hegemony has its origins in Lenin’s capitalist imperialism (Lenin 
1990[1914]).13 As banking centralizes, the fluidity and profitability of finance capital 
tends to promote investment in all aspects of the economy beyond national boundaries. 
Once investment capital is concentrated in a few oligopolistic financial groups, the groups 
tend to have similar investment profiles and priorities. In Mintz and Schwartz’ (1985) 
modern version of the theory, corporate activity is constrained to follow the priorities set 
by finance capitalists because of a combination of institutional connections between the 
hegemonic financial institutions and other standard setters. These include direct 
intervention in key industrial firms during periodic business crises, the pressure derived 
from institutional stockholding, and by the expectation among all firms that future capital 
needs will be judged according to their conformity to the behavioral and investment 
profiles that these hegemonic lenders favour. In the long run, however, financial 
decision-making is paramount, at least in broad strokes, and the intersection of financial 
and nonfinancial constraint is financial hegemony by financial institutions and other 
standard setters (Mintz and Schwartz 1985: 107). The dominant lenders like the IMF & 
WB and Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and other credit rating companies 
create a set of constraints that constitute isomorphic pressures on the firms operating 
within the global financial system. 
                                            
12 The IFRS is to develop one set of globally accepted financial reporting standards. The IFRS foundation 
and IASB (International Accounting Standards Board) cooperate with global stakeholders, investors, 
national standard-setters, regulators/auditors, academics who are interested in developing global standards. 
All G20 countries have established time lines to converge with the IFRSs. See 
http://www.ifrs.org/Use+around+the+world/Use+around+the+world.htm  
13 Lenin’s argument was based on Hobson’s earlier work(1971 [1938]) and later extended by Hilferding 
(1981[1910]). Zeitlin’s work (Zeitlin 1974) revived the interest of scholarship to explain the role of capital 
flows and financial institutions in determining political economic trajectories in America (Mizruchi 1996, 
Palmer, Friedland, and Singh 1986, Mizruchi and Sterns 1994, Useem 1996, Glasberg 1989), in European 
countries (Stokman, Ziegler, and Scott 1985) and in Japan (Gerlach 1992).  
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Corporate Financial Behaviour in the PDS 
  
Large corporations emulate the best practices of TNCs in the context of 
hegemonic global standard as addressed above.14 What specific mechanisms operated in 
those practices? With the role of external impact considered, the overlapping domains 
among domestic actors and their global nexus need to be at the center of analysis. The 
relational domains are the arenas of political competition for hegemonies.   
First, let us disentangle the mediated effects on financial behavior, a result of the 
decline of the DS during the period of neo-liberal reform. Transnational capital exerts 
influence on business practice when banks from Western financial markets deal directly 
with national business groups, or when these ties are mediated by the indigenous 
government. One mechanism of state-mediation is the practice of measuring a country’s 
sovereign rating. The ratings, while judging the country’s business climate, are maintained 
by key global firms, including S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, and IBCA. These institutions compete 
with nation-states for information that is used to create a country’s economic profile; and 
their opinions often have tangible impact on investment judgments. The sovereign rating 
is meant to judge the capacity for timely payment of financial commitments, and 
thus—although the rating is given to the country as a whole—directly affects foreign loans 
of individual firms (Lee 2003). This combination of national evaluation with firm-level 
consequences severely leverages the nation-state behavior, since a low rating coerces the 
government to enact and enforce measures that assure prompt repayment of international 
obligations, both for itself and for major domestic companies. The sovereign ratings, 
therefore, exert tremendous pressure on the PDS to adjust its own actions to the standards 
and demands of transnational entities, undermining the state monopoly of standard in 
private sector.  
Second, the direct effect of global capitalism on corporate behaviors, regarding 
financial and management should be addressed. The hegemonic position of foreign 
financial institutions appears in corporate boards and/or in the position of a direct 
investor holding voting stocks. Finance hegemony theory maintains that institutions at the 
nodes of capital flows exercise definitive leadership over business decision-making within 
the American economy (Mintz and Schwartz 1985). Global financial institutions exercise 
a similar hegemony over the TNCs that rise to the global market from emerging 
economies. As domestic firms expand into the global marketplace and establish 
production facilities abroad, they seek to enter the already existing TNC community. Such 
entry involves submitting to the established patterns of this organizational field, while 
following its established leadership, the multinational financial community. This 
                                            
14 For the new global market order re/generated by world best practice and benchmarking across nations 
aspiring to national competitiveness, see Sklair (2001) chapter 5. 
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integration of domestic large firms into global networks created an excuse for business 
groups to request further deregulation from the state. Meanwhile, foreign financial 
institutions may invade the once self-contained financial networks of the host country and 
upset the state-centered balance within these networks.  
Seen this way, finance hegemony of transnational financial institutions is an 
ongoing reality of the post-developmental era. This hegemony is made visible in two ways. 
The presence of representatives from global financial institutions on the boards of 
directors is a signal that transnational capital flows are being effectively monitored. 
Foreign major stockholders, e.g., non/institutional investors in the domestic financial 
industry are another.15 The foreign direct investment (FDI) trend in national economy 
indicates the direct effect of finance hegemony on corporate financial behavior as well as 
the changed role of PDS. Though the effects of FDI have been controversial, current 
practices of finance capital support the capital dependency theory of the Marxian 
tradition.16 The past two decades evinced the increasing FDI in emerging economies.17 
 
Coordinator, the New Face of the PDS 
 
Leveraged by the transnational finance hegemony, the state voluntarily discards 
the role of controller and becomes a coordinator among competing interests. In doing so, 
the state seeks to preserve national interests and guide them into reinvestment in the local 
economy. As the state becomes more a flexible coordinator than a protector of exclusive 
social ties, the state’s intact domain becomes marginalized with a notable trend of 
reducing state-owned enterprises and privatization. Meanwhile, capitalist domain enlarges 
as business groups go global in orientation. The business groups and the state become 
rivals while the bargaining between business groups and civil society is dramatically 
expanded. The controlling power of the DS is transformed by both democratization and 
globalization.  
                                            
15 According to the OECD Benchmark Definition, 10% rule applies to become direct investment as holding 
stocks in the form of voting stock. www.oecd.org   
16 Economic sociologists, e.g., Chase-Dunn (1998 [1989]) and Firebaugh and Beck (1994), continued to test 
capital dependency theory. The foreign investment appeared to negatively affect both richer and poorer 
developing countries with stronger effect within the richer. The relationships hold independently of 
geographical area (Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978). Contrary to the Marxists, Firebaugh 
(1992) found a positive effect of foreign capital on economic growth conditional upon exogenous factors— 
the differential productivity of foreign versus domestic investment; and the negative externalities from 
foreign capital penetration. Dixon and Boswell (1996) reappraised Firebaugh and found that less-developed 
countries dependent on foreign capital show slower economic growth, higher income inequality, and 
possibly impaired domestic capital formation. 
17 Emerging markets took the largest share of FDIs made by businesses for the years 2012 and 2013. The 
share of FDI claimed by Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa has almost doubled since 2008. Wall 
Street Journal, January 28, 2014.  
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Tri-partite bargaining among state, business and civil society, becomes a factor in 
projecting economic trajectories. The tri-partite domain reflects internal democratic 
consolidation and external globalization where the state houses the negotiation between 
civil society and the private sector. The autonomy of civil society is always a crucial factor 
even in the most authoritarian states and further expands with civilian globalization. The 
global NGO network and personal contact provide resources and strategies for political 
action. While the state is actively engaged in international governmental organizations 
(IGOs), both capitalist class actions and bottom-up social movements substantially 
increase.18 People are organized into groups both within and across national borders that 
limit state sovereignty (Sassen 1998; Sassen 2000; Sklair 2001). Yet, the state is not only 
constrained by this bottom-up movement, but often actively chooses to yield the position 
of controller, responding to the realpolitik of globalization. Ironically, this much more 
democratic PDS is constrained both internally and externally. Symptomatic is the IMF 
bailout during the East Asian economic crisis: the state that once dominated labour and 
business groups now strives to coordinate domestic industrial relations, and the bi-lateral 
agreement between business groups and IGOs and other foreign financial institutions.   
The state interacts with the global environment in two distinct ways. One is the 
direct interaction via intergovernmental networks between the global economy and the 
nation-state. For instance, the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) 
meetings and forums continuously produce international consensuses around global 
financial matters.19 The effects are negotiated through domestic bargaining and produces 
changes in the behavior of business groups. Trade blocs try to strengthen the economic 
and political ties among the subsets of nations at the governmental level. Meanwhile, the 
IMF structural adjustment plan illustrates contemporary relations between the global 
political economy and domestic actors. Such institution’s prescription implies decreased 
nation-state sovereignty and the increased power of foreign lenders. It also draws 
attention to the role of TSMOs (transnational social movement organizations) as the 
counterforce of regional FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) and the global financial system. 
Although the states formally sign IMF plans, they are in fact agreeing to economic plans 
imposed externally, plans that often reflect the interests of transnational capital, e.g. 
                                            
18 Activists share tactics globally while interacting with the local mass public in socio-cultural space 
through high tech strategies, e.g. pod-casted news and political music concerts as well as traditional direct 
action. A study in the 1990s found that the number of NGO and TSMO including the membership size 
increased both in the global North and the South (Smith, chapter 3 in Smith et. al. 1997, p.49-50). The 
current civil forums linked to World Social Forum (WSF) first begun in 2001 indicate the highly expected 
significance of global civil society intervening in social change. Their regional/thematic forums have 
addressed diverse issues like financial crises, democracy, human rights, war, drug trafficking, etc. (Smith et 
al. 2007). 
19 The CGFS, a central bank forum monitors and examines issues relating to financial markets and systems. 
Members are deputy governors, other senior officials of central banks, and the Economic Adviser of the 
BIS. Member institutions are mostly from G20, see: http://www.bis.org/cgfs. 
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capital demands to open up a state for foreign direct investment (FDI), are imposed as 
IMF conditionalities.  
Yet, the IMF is opposed by TSMOs, for instance, Fifty Years is Enough. In a 
globalized economic sector, TSMOs can add pressures through the global socio-economic 
environment, which directly challenges state autonomy.20 In some cases, there is direct 
confrontation between TNCs and TSMOs, but more typically the outcomes of such 
conflict are consolidated in the form of specific legal arrangements of a nation-state.21 In 
the case of IMF conditionalities, for instance, some may be modified by the state to satisfy 
conflict between TNCs and TSMOs. The impact of ever-growing direct cooperation 
between domestic NGOs and INGOs has not been addressed in the state-centered 
approach. TSMOs tend to reinforce supporting networks of social relations for direct 
action, providing resources and stimulating one another to attack transnational sources of 
common problems (Chepurenko 2010, 14-5). These civil society changes have created 
both tensions and cooperation within and across national boundaries, as INGOs attempt, 
with more and more success, “to intervene in global political processes once monopolized 
by states” (Smith, Pagnucco, and Chatfield 1997, 65). The global civil society networks 
may indicate the degree of political opportunity that civil society enjoys. Consequently, 
globalization challenges the autonomous decision-making of the nation-state and forces 
the state to come to the bargaining table with business and civil society. Now the key for 
social democracy under PDS has more to do with the power game between the civil 
society and the capitalist class interests, rather than the old frameworks that heavily 
focused on how to win against the oppressive DS government. 
 
Chaebol, the State and Civil Society in Korea: An Empirical Analysis 
 
At the outset of the “Korean miracle”, the state nurtured the chaebols, seeing them 
as a better vehicle for rapid economic growth than relying on small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). The contradictions of institutional autonomy were avoided by 
authoritarian politics that were solicitous of already established businesses. The state 
directed major capital flows toward chaebols while allowing the repression of unions that 
                                            
20 The first Occupy protest to receive wide coverage was Occupy Wall Street in New York City's Zuccotti 
Park, which began on September 17, 2011. Over the next twenty days, protests had occurred in over 95 
cities across 82 countries, and over 600 of the U.S. communities. Global solidarity around the Anti-FTA 
movements in emerging countries (www.bilaterals.org) and the synergy of occupy movements across the 
globe after global financial crisis are noteworthy (www.washingtonpost.com Oct 15, 2011).  
21 Global sweatshop watch movement against transnational manufacturing companies like NIKE and 
Forever21 pushed the governmental legal measure for improving working condition of the factory workers 
by directly challenging the company. Similarly, “rank-and-file internationalism” focuses on labour-right 
violations in the Third World. Despite the insufficient world-wide enforcement, there has been noticeable 
advancement at the practical level.   
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arose to challenge their labour practices (Chang 1999, 60-67). The export-oriented 
industrialization was a key locomotive that integrated the Korean economy into the global 
market. Chaebols perfectly suited this purpose, and the Park Jung-Hee regime, born in the 
military coup of 1961, worked with established chaebols throughout the 1960s’ East Asian 
miracle era. The partnership of Park and the chaebols remained firm as the country 
moved steadily toward economic prosperity (Kim 1997, 100).  
However, a friction began to develop between the government and the chaebols 
after the second military coup in 1980. The first public sign of this friction was the 
regulation of the chaebols after General Chun became Korean president (Lee 1997, 46-77). 
From that moment forward, the government oscillated between policies of regulation and 
deregulation (Harvey 2005). The Chun regime struggled to guide the behavior of the 
chaebols; a dramatic departure from the Park regime, which had maintained seamless 
relationships based on uncontested government control. To this end, Chun implemented a 
series of regulatory policies, including the termination of financial support from banks to 
certain business groups. As a result, one of the chaebols, Kukche Group in 1985 went 
bankrupt, the first such bankruptcy since the economic boom began. The negative control 
by the state over the chaebols increased resistance against government interference. 
Nevertheless, the Chun regime sought to shore up the chaebols by enunciating labour 
policies aimed at eliminating any possibility that the rapidly developing labour movement 
would become an active counterforce (Kim 1997, 200-203) to the demands and dictates of 
industry. 
Unlike the Park regime, the Chun (1980-1988) and the Roh (1988-1993) 
administrations relaxed the exclusive partisanship through new deconcentration policies 
against chaebols. The chaebols made every effort to deter the state from executing these 
policies and ultimately managed to vitiate the policy.22 Other policies designed to rein in 
the chaebols met similar fates, including the revised Fair Trade Act, which prohibited 
firms within chaebols from giving each other favorable terms of trade. The government 
acted with its accustomed autonomy, but effective resistance by the chaebols narrowed the 
scope of the amendment and enforcement of the Act (Lee 1997, 77f). During the 1980s, 
the state took the regulatory posture of limiting the economic independence of chaebols, 
but experienced commensurate frustrations. The chaebols acquired important and diverse 
holdings in real estate and financial institutions, thus further constraining state action, 
while accusing the government of failing to provide the information and leadership 
needed to cushion the crisis that arose in the late 1980s. The state apparatus for economic 
                                            
22 Chaebols had a well-structured organization for corporate action through The Federation of Korean 
Industries (FKI), the biggest lobby in Korea. The association was launched in 1961 as Businessmen’s 
Association to induce American capital investment and encouraged to be economic partnership of 
government as KFI in 1968. Later on, it evolved into the primary mechanism for sustaining hegemonic 
position in bargaining with both the state and labor. FKI pursues free market, free enterprise and free 
competition as its core ideology. http://www.fki.or.kr/en/  
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formation had comprised the Economic Planning Board (EPB) (1961-1994) and Ministry 
of Finance (MoF). The EPB, for more than thirty years of economic development had 
constrained the private sector and limited its ties to transnational capital. By the 1990s, the 
state was no longer able to restrict access to transnational capital, demonstrating the 
decline of the DS in Korea. 
In responding to globalization, the civilian president Kim Young-Sam enunciated 
extensive neo-liberal reforms and justified these changes as necessary adjustments for the 
national economy to survive in the global competition. The EPB and MoF were merged 
into the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) in 1994 for that purpose.23 The 
hoped-for consequence was to expand international investment capital, both inflow and 
outflow. Many chaebols invested abroad, consistent with the economic plans of president 
Kim’s policy since 1992. Yet it was not strictly speaking dictated by the logic of the 
nation’s own investment strategies. Rather, like other MNCs, chaebols pursued emerging 
neo-liberal capitalist norms, including a global consumerist ideology. Like other DSs, the 
Korean state “adapted” to the new global market order in situations where transnational 
corporations are permitted to dominate the country’s relationship to the world economy.  
Globalization also allowed private sectors in Korea to develop political economy 
expertise. Corporate institutes started competing with state-sponsored expertise on the 
internal market and promoting a global consumerist ideology. By 2005, many of the large 
firms among the thirty largest chaebols in Korea ran their own political economic research 
institutes.24 Not only business groups established their own affiliated research institutes, 
but also non-for-profit NGOs grew in numbers and in influence. In 1994, for example, 
the activists, scholars and lawyers launched People’s Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy (PSPD), inherited from various democratic movements during the military 
dictatorship. To promote democratic participation in government policy-making and 
reforms, PSPD in 1996 established an auxiliary research institute, Institute for 
Participatory Society (IPS). In 2004, PSPD also obtained a special consultative status with 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and started to advocate 
                                            
23 In 2008, the MOFE and the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) was again merged into the Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) to coordinate fiscal policy and inter-ministerial policy. Meanwhile, the 
MOFE’s authority onver financial market was transferred to the Financial Services Commission (FSC). 
www.mosf.go.kr  
24 The institutes include Samsung (www.seriworld.org), Daewoo (www.dweri.re.kr), LG (www.lgeri.com), 
POSCO (www.posri.re.kr), Hyundai (www.hri.co.kr), Kia (www.kiaeri.co.kr), Daishin (www.deri.co.kr) and 
much more. Their researches are publicly credited and published by their own affiliated publishers, 
including web journals. The Korea Economic Daily publishes the list every year and it includes the 
measurement of policy influence of the institute. (www.hankyung.com). As of 2012, The Korea Economic 
Daily reported that six corporate research institutes ranked within the top 25 economic policy think tanks. 
For another indicator of such influence, the SERI (Samsung Economic Research Institute) ranked in the 
first place in the top 100 of the Korea’s think tanks for the four consecutive years, 2008-2011. Chart 1 
illustrates the shifts in the makings of economic knowledge for the past three decades.  
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before various UN bodies including the UN Human Rights Council and the Security 
Council. 25 Both the corporate affiliated research institutes and NGO-run institutes 
continued to grow.  
In implementing neo-liberal policy, the government opened domestic capital 
markets, which allowed chaebols to borrow from financial institutions domiciled in core 
Western countries. These externalized lending relationships made the chaebols subject to 
conditions set by the global financial system, thus compromising the hegemony of 
domestic banks of Korea. The balance of payment crisis in 1997 bankrupted some 
chaebols (including the Hanbo, Jinro, and Kia Groups) and forced others to alter key 
practices to satisfy WB and IMF conditions. These newly instituted constraints enacted a 
normative isomorphism26 in which chaebols began emulating the MNCs domiciled in 
other countries.27  
Meanwhile, the civil society grew as a strong counter-force to the capitalist class 
during the 1990s. Social movement organizations, including labour unions have been 
influential in the domestic political process. The experience of using militant action to 
oppose the authoritarian state empowered civil society to demand changes in the state 
bureaucracy and private sector. During the 1980s, the labour movements critiqued the 
Park, Chun, and Roh regimes for the authoritarian structures that hindered 
socioeconomic development. In a direct attack on the labour-repressive policies of these 
regimes, the labour movement targeted both the state and large employers. They enlisted 
the support of student movements, and thus became a rallying point for civil society. 
These early protests hardly had immediate success until the Great Workers’ Struggle and 
the June Democratic Protest in 1987. The democratic trade union movement held a 
nation-wide May Day rally which led to organizing the Korean Trade Union Congress 
(KTUC, Chun-no-hyup). Chun-no-hyup mainly consisted of unions in the manufacturing 
sector and paved the way for a more consolidated democratic union movement in the 
1990s. As a result of membership in the ILO (International Labor Organization), major 
national configurations came together as the Joint Committee for Ratification of ILO 
Basic Conventions and Labour Law Reform. The Committee mobilized the unions for the 
“1992 National Workers Rally” and tried building a consolidated national organization. 
The subsequent efforts led to the formation in June 1993 of the Korean Council of Trade 
Union Representatives (KCTUR, Chun-no-dae), which brought together leaders of the 
democratic trade unions into a unity. Founded on the preceding struggles of Chun-no-dae, 
the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU, Min-ju--noh-chong) was established in 
                                            
25 www.peoplepower21.org  
26 According to Powell and DiMaggio (1991), major pressure for normative isomorphism usually comes from 
from professionalism, an expertise now vested in MNCs and global financial actors like IMF, World Bank.   
27 As for the behavioral pattern of these global actors, see Sklair (2001), chapter 5; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and 
and Ramirez (1997).  
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1995 with 862 enterprise unions and a total membership of 418,000. The confederation 
has emerged as the representative organization of Korean workers and the trade union 
movements for democratization.28 However, the union movement solidarity contributed 
to the growing friction between the state and the chaebols. These events were the prelude 
to dramatic changes in the tripartite relationship that occurred in the PDS era. In addition 
to labour solidarity, the new middle class emerged as significant actor in transforming 
social relations from authoritarian to democratic in various organizations in Korea 
(Chung 2005).29   
Combined with the substantial pressure emanating from the integration of the 
economy into the global market, growing civil society brought important changes in the 
functioning of the Korean state— from a controller to a coordinator. Since the mid-1990s, 
Korean scholars (Kim 1994, Choi 2009, Im 1994, Lim 2007) reexamined whether the 
developmental dictatorship advanced or hindered the economy and disputed the myth 
that authoritarian structure yields economic growth. The coordinator state differs from its 
controlling predecessor because it no longer depends on political-economic coercion as 
the primary vehicle for enforcing state regulatory policies; it must instead negotiate 
mutually beneficial policies among key actors in domestic politics. Unlike regulatory 
states that seek to coordinate the diversified interests of domestic capital, this PDS 
implements global standards that in turn ironically reinforces transnational capitalist 
hegemony. While remaining as lender of last resort on the national capitalists’ behalf, the 
PDS configures the form of political neutrality by allowing civil society to organize.   
 
State Coordination and Financial Liberalization 
 
The PDS model illustrates that the shifts in the state’s political positions reciprocate 
with its role in the socio-economic relations. In the Korean context, the interrelatedness 
originates from the dirigiste inclination of chaebol-state patron relationship. The evolution 
from a DS controller to a PDS coordinator was accompanied by a parallel shift from a 
bureaucratic authoritarian state to a liberal democratic state.30 The changed role of the 
state needs to be interpreted in both economic and socio-political terms and it is the 
financial function of the state that is central to both of these realms.  
                                            
28 By 1997, the membership increased to over 526,300 in 1,144 unions and became the successor to a 
of struggle of Korean workers while committed to advancing workers' empowerment by building industrial 
unionism and workplace democracy. As of 2012, 143 solidarity organizations from civil society are 
to KCTU. See www.kctu.org and www.nodong.org.   
29 Chung (2005)’s research analyzed South Korean data from the World Values Survey 1995 which 
measures the general populations’ political cultures and attitudes using a probability sample of 1253 men 
and women over 16 years of age.  
30 For more discussions on democratic consolidation processes in developing countries including Korea, 
see Ho-Kee Kim 2000a and 2000b and Sung-Hack Lim (2003).  
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Unlike most Western capitalist states, the Korean state itself was the leading actor 
of capital accumulation. This had a strong impact on the chaebols’ political behavior, since 
they could not risk tampering with their economic standing by indulging in independent 
political action. As the state’s financial monopoly began to erode, so did the political 
control that the state could exercise over the private sector. Meanwhile, capitalists had 
already become more directly influential in the households’ economy through their 
dominant share in the production market and their political leverage in the labour market. 
Since the early 1980s, when the country was even nicknamed as the “Chaebol Republic”, 
rapidly accumulating wealth and denser social networks have facilitated coordinated 
action among chaebols. During the 1990s, the capitalist class matured into a dominant 
political force.  
One indicator of this new coordination appeared in the 1992 National Assembly 
Election, when the National Unity Party, based in the Hyundai Group, ran a strong third 
despite having been formed only two months before the election. This sudden rise 
reflected the newly unleashed energy among a disgruntled electorate no longer content to 
accept the traditional choices offered by the established parties, and therefore willing to 
support the corporate representatives in the National Unity Party as a possible alternative 
(Kang 1998). This, however, fails to explain Hyundai’s willingness to challenge the 
established parties, when even a strong third place vote would leave it vulnerable to 
retribution by state managers loyal to the existing major parties. Since state regulation 
had been dissipating, Hyundai’s managers (and other chaebol leaders) were emboldened; 
instead of ingratiating themselves with state managers by uncritically accepting 
government policy, they sought to form state policy congenial to their corporate plans. 
The Unity Party was one prong of a new activist approach among chaebols toward 
government policy formation.   
The economic policy at the turn to PDS under the president Kim Young-Sam was 
crystalized in financial liberalization and a transparent financial transaction system. The 
Real Name Financial Transaction Act was legislated by the President’s Commission on 
Finance and Economy Code 16 of 1993 with Congressional approval.31 The mandatory usage 
of real names for financial transactions made it possible to track capital sources and flows. 
This transparency was aimed at discouraging informal/unfair transactions while facilitating 
sound development of the financial industry. This legal act paved the way for the Korean 
financial industry to become deeply involved in the global financial system.  
Financial liberalization policies, meanwhile, yielded drastic changes, including 
interest rate liberalization, capital account liberalization, a competitive exchange rate and the 
                                            
31  This legal action was further reinforced by being legislated as The Act on Real Name Financial 
Transactions and Guarantee of Secrecy the Legal Act code number 5493 on December 31, 1997. (Korea 
Ministry of Government Legislation. www.law.go.kr ) 
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liberalization of FDI.32 Finance capitalism emerged in Korea as the government made vast 
efforts to increase the financial assets and financial interrelations ratio (FIR) (Table 1). 
Observing the global expansion of finance capitalism, the government strongly felt the 
urgency of restructuring and advancing the domestic financial industry. It is not a 
coincidence that FIR emerged as a crucial economic indicator of nation’s cumulative financial 
assets in the central bank’s documents. The FIR was 2.6-2.8% in the 1970s but continued to 
increase up to 4.92% by the end of 1993. The government in reference to the U.S. (6.55% in 
1992), Japan (7.81% in 1992) made an effort to improve the ratio.33 As a late developer, the 
government tried to benchmark the advanced capitalist system in reference to the FIR trends. 
This in turn, deeply integrated the Korean economy into the global financial system while the 
effort to restructure the financial industry affected corporate financial behaviours 
domestically. Moreover, as Charts 1 and 2 demonstrate, the Korean States transition from DS 
to PDS is marked by it withdrawal from the financial sector, particularly in regard to 
commercial lending. 
 
 
Table 1. Financial Assets (unit: trillion KRW) and FIR (Total Financial Assets/Nominal 
GNI)  
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Financial 
Assets Total  
27 114 312 770 1852 3592 6199 10298 
Financial 
Companies’* 
Assets 
8 41 92 224 468 893 1474 2376 
FIR 2.7 3.0 3.8 4.1 4.7 6.2 7.2 8.8 
Source: Bank of Korea and Financial Supervisory Service  
*Note: including banks, insurance company, securities company, brokerage and investment 
bank.   
 
 
 
 
                                            
32 As for the detailed legal measures and historical events in the financial industry of Korea, see 
www.fsc.go.kr   
33 FIR increases when: 1) the subjects of savings and investment are independent of each other; 2) the external 
financing of corporate investment increases; 3) the proportion of indirect financing within the external 
financing increases; 4) stocks and bonds are frequently issued among financial institutions, regenerating 
multiple transactions out of the issued stocks and bonds. For the calculation method of FIR, see the Bank of 
Korea (1996) Economic Indicators, p.124. 
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Chart 1. Makings of Economic Knowledge Producing Body* 
 
Source: magazine.hankyung.com 
 
*Note: The Hankyung Business conducted a survey research by recruiting 120 respondents 
from 4 organizational categories, i.e. governmental, corporate, NGO affiliations and 
research universities; and 6 professional fields, i.e. national security and diplomacy, politics, 
social welfare and education, economy and industry, women and labour, science and 
technology, and environment and energy. The survey was done between November 14 and 
25, 2008 on behalf of The Korea Economic Magazine, a weekly economic professional 
magazine of Korea. The respondents listed top ten organizations in each field where they 
work as a profession; then the total frequency counted to come up with top 100 for total. 
Exceptionally, the organizations in science and technology field were measured by the size 
of funding for research. 
 
Chart 2. Foreign Loans Arrivals Total (in Million USD)  
  
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance, The Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
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The shifts away from financial control by the state were embedded in larger 
processes of political turmoil, including a political impeachment and major economic 
initiatives, like the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s effort to stimulate “job growth and 
foreign investment” as part of a larger program designed to turn “Korea into a logistics 
and financial hub for Northeast Asia.”34 The explicit goal of Roh’s program to stimulate 
foreign investment involved the directing of investment to certain chosen sectors with a 
minimal attempt to shape the impact of the investment—these choices were left to the 
global capitalists and to the markets that facilitated the investment process. Importantly, 
the PDS under the Roh administration also sought to create a peaceful labour 
environment, creating space for the autonomous associations of civil society. Union 
negotiations directly with government and business would have been unthinkable only 
two decades previous.  
 
Direct Effects of Global Capitalism on Corporate Financial Behaviour 
 
Korea’s manufacturing industry for the past 60 years has grown from 7.4% (1953) to 
30.6% (2010) of GDP (Cho, Park, and Kang 2012). Large firms35 focusing on manufacturing 
have been leading companies in the industrial development and economic growth of Korea. 
During the DS era, chaebols had a low BIS capital adequacy ratio and a high debt-to-equity 
ratio. The major source of debts was the investment banks controlled by the state central bank. 
The developmental policy encouraged the central bank to lend more money to large firms 
than SMEs (Small Medium Enterprises).  
By the mid-1990s, the profitability of the thirty largest chaebols continued falling 
(Chang 2003, 14). Many chaebol affiliates were inefficient and unable to cover their own 
financing costs. Their investments abroad, financed by loans from foreign capital, were 
unprofitable, at least in the short term. To qualify for loan restructuring in the global 
market, the chaebols were forced to undertake reforms in their business strategies.   
In the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, the proportion of stockholders via direct financing 
stretched as the large firms improved their capital adequacy ratios. Corporations preferred 
direct financing to indirect financing. The crisis offered the Korean economy an opening to 
adopt global standards in finance and to open to a global capital market and foreign direct 
investment, fully orienting the economy toward the neoliberal economic order. The positive 
effect expected was the expansion of transparent market transactions, autonomy and 
                                            
34 http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2004/05/12/200405120020.asp 
35 The Small Medium Enterprise Basic Law in Korea defines any business entities hire more than 300 employees 
as large firms, otherwise SMEs (www.law.go.kr) while the Fair Trade Commission considers the total asset over 
5,000 million in USD (www.ftc.go.kr)  
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openness of market. Nevertheless, its final outputs yielded a high unemployment rate and 
growing inequality.36  
As the financial industry further liberalized, the international financial market 
became the preferred source for large borrowers with global reach for two important 
reasons. One can be found in the relative interest rates for corporate bonds and bank loans 
in force during the key transition period. Whereas corporate bond rates as of 1992 far 
exceeded the Korean bank prime rate (18.9% to 11.3%), the two rates converged in 1998, 
when the rising prime slightly exceeded the falling interest rate of corporate bonds (15.2% 
to 15.1%).37 The two remained equal thereafter, meaning that large firms that could 
qualify for corporate bonds would pay no penalty for using them. Since corporate bonds 
carried less specific oversight of government institutions, they were far more attractive to 
both issuers and buyers who participate in the bond market. This option was therefore 
adopted by the major chaebols; and foreigners continued to rush to bond markets. Large 
foreign investments were attracted to Korean domestic bonds as the fiscal sustainability 
and low public debt continue.38 Moreover, the financial independence of the largest 
chaebols trickled down to other Korean enterprises, since the intra-chaebol connections 
often gave them indirect access to these same global financial resources. These changes in 
the Korean lending profile demonstrate that the largest chaebols had become members of 
the TCC, with the option of transgressing national boundaries in pursuit of economic 
self-interest. While such membership also brought the chaebols under the discipline of the 
global financial system, this discipline was (perhaps ironically) much looser than that 
exercised by the Korean state.39  
 While the Korean economy recovered from the crisis, the proportion of foreign 
capital in the domestic financial industry increased sharply; the rescue operation created 
permanent changes in ownership arrangements. As the first evidence, the proportion of 
foreign stakeholders increased yielding irrevocable changes in the ownership arrangement. 
By 2004 three of the eight largest commercial banks (Jeil Bank, Foreign Exchange Bank and 
Hanmi Bank) became subsidiaries of global financial firms, and FDI held a preponderant 
proportion of stock in three of the remaining five (Kookmin Bank 77.8%, Shinhan Finance 
64.3%, Hana Bank 65.5%)(Park 2004). The same trends operated throughout the upper 
reaches of the Korean business community: foreign ownership in the banking industry as 
a whole rose from 6.1% to 27% in a scant five years from 1999 to 2004; while the 
insurance industry recorded an increase from 4.6% to 15.6%. During the same five year 
period, foreign ownership among all publicly traded shares on the Korean stock exchange 
                                            
36 The structural adjustment after crisis, for instance directly affected the unemployment rate which increased 
from 2.1% in 1995 to 9.6% in 2010 (Cho et al. 2012, pp. 25f).   
37 www.ecos.bok.or.kr. The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System.  
38 www.iif.com/emr/ap/korea Institute of International Finance.  
39 For a careful distinction between hegemony and control, see Mintz and Schwartz, 1985.   
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increased from 6.5% to 25.5%.40 Foreign shareholdings in commercial banking industry 
have expanded since the post-crisis period: 16.4% in 1997, 50.2% in 2003, 59.7% in 2004 
and 57.8% in 2007.41 According to the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) report42, 
foreign equity funds, often private, had acquired controlling interests in Korean domestic 
banks after the crisis. The foreign capital in the Korean financial industry and in the stock 
market has remarkably increased (Chart 3).   
 
Chart 3. Stock Market Shares by Shareholders (%)  
 
 
Source: Korea Exchange, chart reproduced form Economic Statistics System (ecos.bok.or.kr)  
 
 
The increases of foreign capital indicate that the integration of the Korean 
economy into the global financial system had gained irreversible momentum during this 
post-crisis period. Foreign-owned banks particularly focus on expanding commercial 
banking or household lending rather than offering a wide range of financial services to 
other industrial sectors. Secondly, foreign banks emphasized standardized credit 
evaluation over local information and long-term customer relationships. By April 2004 
foreign debt among the largest Korean businesses had reached $44.3 billion,43 and the 
                                            
40 The market occupancy ratio for each sector is measured by total assets in 2003 on average for banks; total 
amounts of stock exchanges during January 2004 to July 2004 for stock market, total incomes from 
insurance policy sales of life insurance companies during April 2004 to June 2004. Source: Financial 
Supervisory Service, Korea Stock Exchange, Korea Life Insurance Association.  
41 Percent calculated based on stock market prices in Kyungsoo Kim, Byoung-Ki Kim and Young Kyoung 
Suh, “Opening Capital Flows and Implications from Korea” Economic Papers Vol. 12 No. 1 published by 
the Bank of Korea. www.bok.or.kr  
42 http://www.bis.org/pub/cgfs22.htm. 
43 www.fnnews.com reported on April 12, 2004 
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chaebols faced pressure to conform to global standards of business conduct. This included 
adjusting to global accounting standards, implying or requiring new approaches to the 
generation and disposition of profits, and many of these are in stark contrast to 
longstanding Korean government practices. Similarly, shareholder activism, which 
originated in the United States, had become a global phenomenon as institutional 
investors diversified their portfolios internationally.44 This resulted in direct negotiations 
over corporate policy between Korean CEOs and highly opinionated representatives of 
foreign stockholders, and this became another source of friction in which chaebol 
leadership was forced to counter Korean government policies.  
The drift of corporate finance outward into global markets for commercial 
bonds and stocks or international loans, complemented by the Korean banks’ 
migration into security underwriting, created a corporate network within the country 
largely outside of government control or influence. The banks are no longer the 
central location attached to state control where the overarching knowledge of the 
economy was collected, and decision-making over bank loans had once been the 
moment for state strategizing and implementing plans for economic development. 
Beyond this, the changes left a power competition among knowledge producers, since 
no single institution held this central place within the Korean economy. Instead, these 
changes can be seen as part of a general trend toward disorganized capitalism. Once 
the power of the domestic bank declined, “the social ties among firms [became] 
dispersed” and the capacity to coordinate their actions dissipated (Davis and Mizruchi 
1999, 236).  
Because of the concentration of capital, a few large foreign banks began exerting a 
different, but nonetheless tangible, form of control over Korea’s largest firms, beginning 
with the balance of payment crisis in 1997 and deepened by the rapid recovery from the 
crisis. This influence resembled that described by Lenin as the central element in modern 
imperialism: the banks are able to “ascertain exactly the financial position of the various 
capitalists, then to control them, to influence them by restricting or enlarging, facilitating 
or hindering credits, and finally entirely determine their fate (Lenin 1990 [1914], 37).” 
Though the current forms of financial control, mediated through loosely organized 
markets (like the increasingly important stock and bond market), are less programmatic 
than those described by Lenin and less directed than those controlled by the Korean DS, 
the hegemonic global financial system is nevertheless the key legislative and executive 
force in the new global economy.45  
 
 
                                            
44 Useem (1996) cited in Chang (Chang 2003, 31) 
45 Chang (2003) offers a persuasive argument for the vision of global capitalism as hegemony while the 
current practices of the CGFS (Committee on Global Financial System) confirm such argument.   
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Conclusion 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s the Korean government was the prototypical DS, acting as 
a controller over economic trajectories and authoritarian control over civil society. But by 
the late 1990s, the state apparatus had been reconfigured as a coordinator to accommodate 
the diverse demands from global financial system, local business groups, and from an 
increasingly autonomous civil society. This decline in state autonomy also needs to be 
considered as a consequence of political democratization. The rise of civil society in the 
1980s paved the way for contested democratic elections of the 1990s, peaceful regime 
change, and a growing responsiveness of government institutions to public opinion. Yet, as 
the PDS became more responsive to both private economic sector and civil society, it 
faltered in providing economic guidance. Transforming itself from a proactive force for 
development into a coordinator to enforce the structural constraints of global capitalism 
which ironically led the Korean state to promote global financial hegemony over domestic 
Korean enterprise and civil society. The state took the position of neutral third party to 
find middle ground among contending actors, most notably domestic and transnational 
capitalists and organized forces of civil society. Ultimately, the leverage of transnational 
financial institutions is, in most instances, predominant, outweighing even the 
cumulative force of other actors in the system. Indeed, the recent history of the Korean 
political economy suggests that the administrative capacity of states in the late developers 
seem to be focused on facilitating the continued functioning of the global financial system. 
The state in the post-developmental context is destined for the role of coordinating and 
striving to leash the finance capital that revives and expands despite the global financial crisis. 
The process of finance capitalism demands our attention to uncover the mechanism through 
which the profit of finance capital is privately enjoyed while the cost socialized.  
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